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Abstract 
The notions "expressive power" or "expressiveness" of knowledge representation languages (KR-
langUages) can be found in most papers on knowledge representation; but these terms are usually 
just used in an intuitive sense. The papers contain only informal descriptions of what is meant by 
expressiveness. There are several reasons which speak in favour of a formal definition of 
expressiveness: For example, if we want to show that certain expressions in one language cannot 
be expressed in another language, we need a strict formalism which can be used in mathematical 
proofs. 
Though we shall only consider KL-ONE-based KR-Ianguage in our motivation and in the 
examples, the definition of expressive power which will be given in this paper can be used for all 
KR-Ianguages with model-theoretic semantics. This defmition will shed a new light on the tradeoff 
between expressiveness of a representation language and its computational tractability. There are 
KR-Ianguages with identical expressive power, but different complexity results for reasoning. 
Sometimes, the tradeoff lies between convenience and computational tractability. The paper 
contains several examples which demonstrate how the definition of expressive power can be used in 
positive proofs - that is, proofs where it is shown that one language can be expressed by another 
language - as well as for negative proofs - which show that a given language cannot be expressed 
by the other language. 
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1. Introduction 
The notions "expressive power" or "expressiveness" of knowledge representation languages 
(KR-Ianguages ) can be found in several papers on knowledge representation ( see e.g., 
Woods (1983), Levesque (1986), Levesque-Brachman (1987), Nebel (1989), or Nebel-
Smolka (1989) ). However, the authors usually give no formal definition of expressiveness, 
but only informal descriptions: 
" ... expressive adequacy, has to do with the expressive power of the representation 
- that is, what it can say. Two components of expressive adequacy are the 
distinctions a representation can make and the distinctions it can leave unspecified 
... " ( Woods (1983), p. 22 ) 
"The expressive power ... determines not so much what can be said, but what can 
be left unsaid." (Levesque-Brachman (1987), p. 82 ) 
For many purposes such an informal view may be sufficient. However, there are at least 
three reasons which speak in favour of a formal approach to expressiveness. Firstly, "the need 
for semantics for representation languages is pretty much agreed upon" (Brachman-Levesque 
(1985), p. XV). Once we have a formal semantics for a language, this semantics should com-
pletely determine what the languages can express, i.e., the expressiveness of the language 
should only depend on this semantics. In addition, one argument for the introduction of formal 
semantics was that it could be used to compare the expressiveness of different KR-formalisms 
( see e.g. Hayes (1974), p. 5, or Nebel (1989), p. 20 ).1 
A second reason is, that we need a formal definition of expressiveness if we want to 
prove that certain expressions in one language cannot be expressed in another language. For 
positive proofs - that is, proofs where it is shown that an expression in one language can be 
simulated by an expression in another language - an intuitive notion of admissible simulations 
is usually sufficient. But if we want to prove that a given expression cannot be simulated by 
any expression in the other language, we need a strict formalism which can be used in mathe-
matical proofs.2 Until now, there are just more or less informal arguments - but no 
mathematical proofs - for the fact that one KR-Ianguage is more expressive than another, for 
example: 
" ... cycles add something to the expressive power. Obviously, they allow putting 
restrictions on semantic structures which cannot be expressed by cycle-free termi-
nologies." ( Nebel (1989), p. 146 ) 
"To give an impression of the expressive power of V, we define a complex infmite 
structure, namely the concept mankind without rebirth .... Note that all possible 
worlds satisfying the ... definition must be infinite. The ability to represent such an 
1 A fonnal defmition "of change in expressive power" of a natural language is used in Keenan-Moss (1985) 
for comparing the expressive power of various subclasses of detenniners. 
2Tbe situation is similar to recursive function theory. where a fonnal definition of computability is 
indespensable for proofs of non-computability. while a rather infonnal description of an algorithm is usually 
enough to demonstrate that a function is computable. 
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infinite structure non-recursively indicates the expressive power of t[.l." ( Schild 
(1988), p. 6, 8 ) 
"It is the case, however, that there are concepts that can be expressed in !FL that 
cannot be expressed in !FL-, such as the concept of a person with at least one son 
and at least one daughter: (AND (SOME (RESTRICT child male» (SOME 
(RESTRICT child female»). In !F L- all attributes are primitive, so sons and 
daughters cannot play the same role (child) and yet be distinguished by their types." 
(Levesque-Brachman (1987), footnote 36) 
We shall reconsider these three examples in Section 5. The third reason in favour of a 
fonnal definition of expressiveness is as follows. It is an empirical fact that "there is a tradeoff 
between expressiveness of a representation language and its computational tractability" 
(Levesque-Brachmann (1987), p. 78 ). But the connection between expressive power of a 
language and the complexity of reasoning over this language is not obvious from a theoretical 
point of view. There may be - and we shall see that there really are - KR-languages .with iden-
tical expressive power but different complexity results for the reasoning component. The fonnal 
definition of expressive power in Section 3 will explain the - rather trivial - reasons for this 
phenomenon.3 Sometimes, the tradeoff lies between convenience and computational 
tractability. 
In this paper we shall only consider KR-languages based on KL-ONE ( Brachman-
Schmolze (1985) ). But the definitions in Section 3 are fonnulated in a more general frame-
work. They may be used for any other KR-language with model-theoretic semantics. Syntax 
and semantics of KL-ONE-based KR-languages will be introduced in Section 2.4 I shall also 
mention some complexity results for subsumption detennination in these languages. The fonnal 
definitions in Section 3 will be motivated by examples from this section. 
Terminologies ( T-boxes ) can be considered as finite sets of first-order fonnulas. A ter-
minological KR-language is characterized by the kind of sets of fonnulas that can be built. For 
some languages the formal semantics allows only a subclass of all first-order models as 
admissible models; e.g., if one wants to have features instead of roles ( Nebel-Smolka (1989) ) 
or fixed-point semantics for cyclic terminologies (Nebel (1987) ). The KR-languages based on 
first-order predicate logic, which are defined in Section 3, will consist of a set of sets of 
fonnulas ( the admissible T -boxes) and a model restriction function. A set of fonnulas r in one 
languages is expressed by the set of fonnulas ~ in the other language, if both sets have "the 
same" models, where equality of models is defined only w.r.t. the important predicates, i.e., 
w.r.t. the predicates occurring in r. Auxiliary predicate symbols, which may occur in ~, will 
have no influence in this notion of "equality" of models. 
3This phenomenon can also be observed in formal language theory: The problem "L(a) = 1:* ?" has quadratic 
complexity for regular expressions while it has exponential complexity for regular expressions with squaring. 
Regular expressions and regular expressions with squaring ( where the regular expression aa can be abbreviated 
by a2 ) have the same "expressive power", they both express regular languages (see Machtey-Young (1978» . 
4In fact, we shall only consider the T-Box formalism of these languages. The introduction will be rather 
short and technical. For more information and motivation see e.g. Brachman-Schmolze (1985) and Nebel (1989). 
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Section 3 also contains two examples and some remarks on the connection between 
expressive power and complexity of subsumption. In Section 4 we shall consider an alternative 
defmition of expressive power, based on concept terms rather than on terminologies. We shall 
also clarify the connection between our notion of "expressiveness" and the notion "conservative 
extension" which is frequently used in logic. The fIfth section of the paper contains examples of 
how the defInition of expressive power can be utilized for the comparison of different KL-
ONE-based KR-Ianguages. 
2. KL-ONE-based KR-Languages 
In KL-ONE-based languages we start with atomic concepts and roles, and use the language 
formalism to defIne new concepts and roles. Concepts can be considered as unary predicates 
which are interpreted as sets of individuals whereas roles are binary predicates which are 
interpreted as binary relations between individuals. The languages ( e.g., 'fL and 'fL- of 
Levesque-Brachman (1987), 'I'f and 9(I'f of Nebel (1989) ) differ in the kind of constructs 
that are allowed for the defmition of concepts and roles. The next defInition introduces some of 
the constructs used in current systems. 
Definition 2.1. ( concept and role terms5 ) 
Let C be a set of concept names and R be a set of role names. The set of concept terms and the 
set of role terms are inductively defIned. As a starting point of the induction, 
(1) any element of C is a concept term and any element of R is a role term. (atomic terms) 
Now let C and D ( R and S ) be concept terms ( role terms) already defmed. 
(2) Then enD is a concept tenn. ( concept conjunction) 
(3) Then R n S is a role term. ( role conjunction) 
(4) Then VR:C is a concept term. ( all-in-restriction, value restriction) 
(5) Then 3R is a concept term. ( exists-restriction) 
(6) Then 3R:C is a concept term. ( exists-in-restriction ) 
(7) Let n be a non-negative integer. Then 3~nR and 3SlR are concept terms. 
( number-restrictions) 
(8) Let A be an element of C. Then .. A is a concept tenn. ( atomic negation) 
The language 'fL- of Levesque-Brachman (1987) uses concept-conjunctions, all-in-
restrictions and exists-restrictions. The language 'I'f of Nebel (1989) uses concept-
conjunctions, all-in-restrictions and number-restrictions. 
The concept and role terms can be used in two different kinds of concept and role 
defmitions: complete and incomplete defmitions. 
Definition 2.2. ( terminologies ) 
Let A, B be concept names, R be a role name, D be a concept term and S be a role term. 
(1) Then A = D and R = S are terminological axioms. (complete defmition) 
(2) Then A !;;; D and R!;;; S are terminological axioms. ( incomplete defInition, specialization) 
(3) Then dis(A,B) is a terminological axiom. (disjointness axiom) 
SWe do not take the usual LISP-like prefix notation, but a more succinct notation due to Schmidt-SchauB 
(1989). 
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A terminology (T-box) is a fmite set of terminological axioms with the additional restriction 
that no concept or role name may appear more than once as a left hand side of a definition. 
A T-box contains two different kinds of concept ( role) names. Defined concepts 
( roles) occur on the left hand side of a complete definition. The other concepts ( roles) are 
called primitive concepts ( roles ). They may be undefined or partially defmed by an incomplete 
defmition. 
Let A, B be concept names and let iJ'be a T-box. We say that A directly uses B in iJ'iff B 
appears on the right hand side of the definition of A. Let uses denote the transitive closure of 
the relation directly uses. Then iJ' contains a terminological cycle iff there exists a concept name 
A in 'I such that A uses A.6 The use of terminological cycles is prohibited in almost all 
terminological languages. 
Nebel (1989) uses complete and incomplete role and concept definitions in the T-boxes of 
his language iJ'~ In addition, he allows disjointness axioms for primitive concepts. 
The following is an example of a T-box in this formalism: Let Man, Woman, Human, 
Male, Female and Father be concept names and let child be a role name. The T-Box Tl consists 
of the following axioms: Man!;;; Human n Male 
Woman !;;; Human n Female 
Father = Man n 3~IChild n 'v'child: Human 
dis (Man, Woman) 
That means a man is human and male but this is not enough to really defme a man; hence 
the incomplete definition. A father is a man who has at least one child and who has only human 
children. There can be no individual who is both a man and a woman. Instead of 3~IChild we 
could have also used 3child. Man, Woman, Human, Male and Female are primitive concepts, 
child is a primitive role and Father is a defined concept. This terminology does not contain a 
cycle. 
The next definition gives a model-theoretic semantics for the languages introduced above. 
Definition 2.3. ( interpretations and models) 
An interpretation I consists of a set dom(l), the domain of the interpretation, and an interpre-
tation function which associates with each concept name A a subset AI of dom(1) and with each 
role name R a binary relation RI on dom(I), i.e., a subset of dom(l) x dom(I). The sets AI, RI 
are called extensions of A, R with respect to I. 
The interpretation function - which gives an interpretation for atomic terms - can be extended 
to arbitrary terms as follows: Let A be a concept name, C, D be concept terms, R, S be role 
terms and n be a non-negative integer. Assume that Cl, DI, RI and SI are already defined. 
6 
(C n D)I 
-
(R n S)I 
.-
(VR:C)I 
-
(3R)1 
-
ClnDI 
RlnSI 
( x E dom(l); for all y such that (x,y) E RI we have y E CI } 
( x E dom(l); there exists y such that (x,y) E RI} 
6See Nebel (1989), p. 56, Definition 3.4. 
(3R:C)1 
-
(3~R)1 
-
(3~nR)1 -
(-,A)I 
-
{ X E dom(I); there exists y such that (x,y) E RI and y E CI } 
{ x E dom(l); card({ y; (x,y) E RI }) ~ n } 
{ x E dom(I); card( { y; (x,y) E RI }) ~ n } 
{ x E dom(I); x eo AI } 
An interpretation I is a model of the T-box tIiff it satisfies 
AI = 0 1 (RI = SI) for all terminological axioms A = 0 (R = S ) in tI, 
AI ~ 0 1 (RI ~ SI) for all terminological axioms A 50 (R 5 S ) in tI, 
AI (\ BI = 0 for all terminological axioms dis(A,B) in tI. 
This definition shows that we may consider these languages as sublanguages of first-
order predicate logic. The concept ( role ) names can be seen as unary ( binary ) predicate 
symbols and the concept terms as abbreviations for formulas with one free variable. For 
example, the term "Man n 3~lChild n 'ifchild: Human" is an abbreviation for the formula 
Man(x) /I. 3y ( child(x,y) ) /I. 'ify ( child(x,y) ~ Human(y) ), 
which has the free variable x.7 Complete definition corresponds to equivalence and incomplete 
definition to implication. The T-box of our example is translated into the following set of 
formulas: 'ifx ( Man(x) ~ ( Human(x) /I. Male(x) ) ) 
'ifx ( Woman(x) ~ ( Human(x) /I. Female(x) ) ) 
'ifx ( Father(x) H ( Man(x) /I. 3y ( child(x,y) ) /I. 'ify ( child(x,y) ~ Human(y) ) ) ) 
'ifx ( -,( Man(x) /I. Woman(x) ) ) 
An important service most tenninological representation systems provide is computing the 
subsumption hierarchy. 
Definition 2.4. ( subsumption of concepts and roles ) 
Let tIbe a T-box and let A, B (R, S ) be concept names (role names). 
A 5tyB ( R 5tyS) iff AI ~ BI (RI ~ SI) for all models I of rr. 
In this case we say that B subsumes A ( S subsumes R ) in 'I!> 
It is not a restriction that we have defined subsumption only for atomic terms. If we want 
to compare the concept terms C, 0 W.r.t. subsumption in tI we may simply add concept 
definitions A = C and B = 0 to tI and compare A and B.9 
Since subsumption relations have to be computed very often in terminological KR-
systems, it is important to know the computational complexity of this problem: How hard is it, 
relative to the size of the given T-box, to compute subsumption relations? Until now, 
complexity results - e.g., in Levesque-Brachman (1985), Nebel (1988) or Schmidt-SchauB-
7Since this translation into logic follows straightforwardly from the definition of the semantics. we do not 
give the details for each construct The translation of number restrictions is rather tedious and may yield very 
long formulas. This is one important reason for using abbreviations. 
8 Since we only allow role-conjunction as construction mechanism for roles, the computation of role 
subsumption is rather trivial. For this reason we shall restrict our attention to concept subsumption. 
9 A and B are meant to be concept names which don't occur in q: 
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Smolka (1988) - are usually not given w.r.t. the size of the actual T-box, but w.r.t. the size of 
the corresponding unfolded T-box.10 In order to unfold a T-box we have to get rid of 
incomplete definitions and disjointness axioms. This will be shown for the above example. A 
complete description of the process can be found in Nebel (1989). 
First, we eliminate the incomplete definitions. For any incomplete definition A !;;; D, a 
new undefined concept Rest-A is introduced which stands for the absent part of the definition 
of A. Applied to the example, this yields the terminology T2 
Man 
Woman 
= 
= 
Human n Male n Rest-Man 
Human n Female n Rest-Woman 
Father = Man n 3~1 child n 'if child: Human 
dis(Rest -Man,Rest -Woman). 
Now, we have only two types of concepts (roles ). Primitive concepts (roles ), which 
are completely undefinedll, and defined concepts ( roles ). In order to eliminate disjointness 
axioms one needs negation of primitive concepts. In the example, we obtain the temiinology T3 
Man 
Woman 
Father 
= 
= 
= 
Human n Male n Rest-Man n D 
Human n Female n Rest-Woman n -J) 
Man n 3~lChild n 'v'child: Human. 
Unfolding of a T-box means substituting defined concepts which occur on the right hand 
side of a definition by their defining terms. This process has to be iterated until there remain 
only primitive concepts on the right hand sides of the definitions. Obviously, this procedure 
terminates if and only if the terminology is acyclic. In the example, we finally obtain T4: 
Man 
Woman 
Father 
= 
= 
= 
Human n Male n Rest-Man n D 
Human n Female n Rest-Woman n-J) 
Human n Male n Rest-Man n D n 3~lChild n V'child: Human. 
The following complexity results for concept subsumption may not be very interesting 
from a practical point of view ( since they refer to very weak languages ), but they will be 
important for the examples in Section 3 and 5. 
Proposition 2.5. ( complexity of subsumption for three small languages ) 
(1) The language 1'£- is defined as follows: we allow concept-conjunction, all-in-restriction, 
exists-restriction and complete definition of concepts, and consider only acyclic, unfolded T-
boxes. Then the complexity of the subsumption test is quadratic in the size of the T -box. 
(2) If we restrict 1'£- to 1'£..0 by not allowing exists-restrictions, we get the same complexity 
result as for 1'£-. 
(3) The language 'I£is defined as 1'£..0 but we also consider acyclic T-boxes which need not be 
unfolded. Then the complexity of the subsumption test is co-NP-complete in the size of the T-
box. 
lOSee Nebel (1989a) for a discussion of this problem. 
1110 the following. "primitive" will always mean "completely undefmed". 
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A proof for (1) can be found in Levesque-Brachman (1987)12 and for (3) in Nebel 
(1989a). Nebel's co-NP-completeness result means that the problem of subsumption determi-
nation in 'TL is most likely not solvable by a polynomial time algorithm. Part (2) of the 
proposition is an immediate consequence of the following lemma: 
Lemma 2.6. Subsumption determination in ~ L- can be reduced in linear time to subsumption 
determination in ~ 4J. 
Proof.l3 Assume that 'Tis a T-box of ~L-. For any role R in 'Tlet PR be a new primitive 
concept. Now substitute any 3R term in 'Tby PR. This yields a T-box 'To of ~4J which has the 
same size as rr. In addition, we have for all concept names A, B occurring in 'Tthat A 5:'TB iff 
A 5:% B. 
3. A Formal Definition of Expressive Power 
In the previous section we have seen that terminologies can be considered as finite sets of first-
order formulas which are built from predicate symbols without using function symbols. 
Different terminological KR-Ianguages allow different sets of formulas. In Section 2, the 
models of such a set 1 of formulas were all the first-order models of 1, i.e., all the interpre-
tations which make all formulas of 1 true. In some cases - e.g., if we want to use features ( see 
Nebel-Smolka (1989) ) or if we consider fixed-point semantics for cyclic terminologies ( see 
Nebel (1987) and Baader (1990a,1990b) ) - it is necessary to take only a subclass of all first-
order models as admissible models. To include features, some of the binary predicate symbols 
must be interpreted as partial functions, and in fixed-point semantics we do not take all fixed-
points as models but only the least or the greatest. This motivates the following definition: 
Definition 3.1. (KR-Ianguages based on frrst-order predicate logic) 
Assume that we have countably many variable symbols and countably many predicate symbols 
of any arity.14 Let FO denote the set of all frrst-order formulas which can be built out of these 
symbols. A KR1-language ( KR-Ianguages based on frrst-order predicate logic) L consists of 
two parts: 
(1) A subset L of the power set of FO, i.e., a set of sets of formulas. 
(2) A model-restriction function ModL which maps a set 1 E L to a subclass 
ModL<D of all frrst-order models of 1. 
Let 11 E LI and 12 E L2 for KRI-languages Ll and L2. We want to define what it 
means that 11 is expressed by 12. First, consider the example in Section 2 where T3, an acyclic 
T-box without incomplete definitions and disjointness axioms, is unfolded. The unfolded T-
box T4 expresses the original T-box T3, because T3 and T4 have exactly the same models. 
Taking this as a defmition of "is expressed by" would be too restrictive, because then the T -box 
TI in Section 2 were not expressed by T2. In models of T2, the extensions of Rest-Man and 
Rest-Woman are connected with the extensions of Man and Woman, while they are absolutely 
free in models ofTI. Anyway, Rest-Man and Rest-Woman are only auxiliary symbols. In fact, 
12Levesque-Brachman (1987) consider subsumption of concept terms w.r.t. the empty terminology. But it is 
easy to see that this is the same as concept subsumption w.r.t. unfolded terminologies as defmed above. 
13This is only a sketch of the proof. For a complete proof see Baader (l990a), Corollary 7.3. 
14We do not restrict the defmition to unary and binary predicate symbols. 
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we are only interested in the interpretation of the predicates which occur in TI. For any 
.predicate occurring in TI we need a corresponding predicate in T2. In the example, the corre-
sponding predicates bear the same name as the original ones. In general, the names of predi-
cates should not be important, i.e., we need a translation function", which translates the 
predicate names in TI into the corresponding names in T2. These ideas can be formalized as 
follows. 
For a subset r of FO let Pred(n denote the set of all predicate symbols occurring in r. 
Assume that we have a mapping "': Pred(rl) ~ Pred(r2), and models M}, M2 of rio r2. The 
elements of Pred(r 2) which are outside of the range of", are auxiliary predicate symbols. We 
say that M1 is embedded in M2 by VI( M1 CV'M2) iff all R in Pred(rl) satisfy RMI = ",(R)M2. 
Equality of classes of models modulo ",-embedding is defined by extensionality, i.e., 
ModLI(rl) =", ModL2(r2) iff for all MI in ModLI(rl) there exists M2 in ModL2(r2) such that 
MI c", M2 and for all M2 in ModLir2) there exists MI in ModLI(rl) such that MI c'" M2. 
We really need both directions of this definition. Obviously, any model of rl should be 
embeddable into a model of r2. On the other hand, r2 should not have more models than are 
needed for this purpose.15 We are now ready for the main defmition of this paper. 
Definition 3.2. Let rl E LI and r2 E L2 for KRI-languages Ll and L2. 
(1) rl can be expressed by r2 iff there exists "': Pred(rl) ~ Pred(r2) such that ModLl(rl) =", 
ModLir 2). 
(2) Ll can be expressed by L2 iff for any r 1 E LI there exists r2 E L2 such that rl can be 
expressed by r2 - i.e., iff there is a mapping X: Ll ~ L2 such that each rl in Ll can be 
expressed by X(r 1)' 
(3) Ll and L2 have the same expressive power iff Ll can be expressed by L2 and vice versa. 
Obviously, if Ll is a sublanguage of L2 - i.e., LI ~ L2 and, for all r ELI, ModLl (n = 
ModL2(r) - then Ll can be expressed by L2. It is easy to see that the restriction to T-boxes 
without incomplete definition does not change the expressive power, if the language allows 
conjunction. The set of all T-boxes without incomplete definition is a subset of the set of all T-
boxes. For the other direction, the mapping X is exemplified in Section 2 by the transformation 
of T 1 to T2.16 As another example, assume that we have a language which contains only acyclic 
T -boxes with complete defmitions. Since unfolding does not change the class of models of a T-
box, the restriction to unfolded T-boxes does not reduce the expressive power of this language. 
In Section 2, we have introduced negation of undefined concepts in order to get rid of 
disjointness axioms. It was shown by an example, how aT-box with disjointness axioms can 
be expressed by a T-box with negation of undefined concepts.16· But negation of undefined 
concepts may increase the expressive power. 
Example 3.3. Let Ll be defined as follows: we allow concept conjunction, negation of un-
defined concepts, complete definition of concepts and consider only acyclic T-boxes. All first-
order models of a T-box are admissible. The language L2 differs from Ll in that negation of 
15Otherwise, a rather trivial set r2 of fonnulas which has all interpretations as models could be used to 
express any set rl of fonnulas which does not contain more predicate symbols than r2. 
16See Nebel (1989), p. 62, Theorem 3.13 for a proof that the conditions of Defmition 3.2 are satisfied. 
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undefmed concepts is not allowed but disjointness axioms are allowed for undefmed concepts. 
We have seen that L2 can be expressed by Ll. The following T-box TI is in LI, but cannot be 
expressed by a T-box in L2: TI:= { A = P, B = -,P, C = Q }, where A, B, C, P, Q are 
concept names (i.e., unary predicate symbols). 
Assume that TI is expressed by the T-box T2 E L2 w.r.t. the mapping "': { A, B, C, P, Q } ~ 
Pred(T2). Without loss of generality we may assume that ",(A), ",(B), ",(C) are defined 
concepts with defining axioms ",(A) = Al n ... n Ak, ",(B) = BI n .... n Bm, ",(C) = CI n ... 
n Cn, where AI. ... , Cn are undefined concepts (the case where ",(A) is undefmed is similar to 
the case k = 1; the condition "AI> ... , Cn undefmed" can be satisfied by unfolding). 
(1) There do not exist i, j such that dis(Cj,Cj) is in T2. Otherwise, the model I of TI defined by 
dom(l) := { a }, AI:= pI := dom(l) =: QI =: CI, BI := 0 would not have a corresponding model 
ofT2· 
(2) We define a model J ofT2 by dom(J) := { a}, CIJ := ... := CnJ := dom(J). The other unde-
fined concepts in T2 are interpreted by the empty set. I7 Since TI is expressed by T2 w.r.t. '" 
there exists a model I of TI with I c'" J. We have a E ",(C)J = CI C dom(l) and hence a E AI 
or a E BI = dom(l) \ AI. 
(3) Without loss of generality we may assume that a E AI = ",(A)J = AIJ n ... n AkJ. Because 
of the definition of J, that means that { AI, ... , Ak} C { CI, ... , Cn }. But then the model!' of 
Tl defined by dome!') := { a}, BI' := dome!') =: QI' =: cI', AI' := pI' := 0 does not have a 
corresponding model of T2. This is a contradiction to our assumption that Tl can be expressed 
by aT-box T2 of L2. Thus we have shown that Ll cannot be expressed by L2. 
In the next example we shall see that primitive negation in Nebel's language 9{rr~ 
(Nebel (1989) ) can be simulated by number-restrictions, which are also present in that 
language. 
Example 3.4. Let Ll be defined as follows: we allow concept conjunction, role conjunction, 
all-in-restrictions, number-restrictions, negation of undefined concepts, complete defmition of 
concepts and roles. We consider only acyclic T-boxes and take all first-order models as 
admissible models. The sublanguage L2 of Ll differs from Ll in that negation is not allowed. 
We shall show that Ll can be expressed by L2. 
Let Tl be a T-box of Ll. For any undefined concept P in TI which occurs negated in TI, we 
introduce a new role symbol Rp and a new concept symbol Ap. Now replace the unnegated 
occurrences of Pin TI by 3~IRp and the negated occurrences -,P by 3~ORp, and add a new 
definition Ap = 3~IRp. This yields aT-box T2 of L2. 
The translation function "': Pred(TI) ~ Pred (T2) is defined by ",(A) := A for all predicate 
symbols A in TI which do not occur negated in TI and ",(P) := Ap for all predicate symbols P 
which occur negated in T 1. 
(1) Let I be a model of TI. We define an interpretation J as follows: dom(J) := dom(I); for all 
predicate symbols A not occurring negated in T}, ",(AY = AJ := AI; for all predicate symbols P 
occurring negated in TI, ",(P)J = ApI:= pI and RpI := { (a,a); a E pI }. 
Then (3~IRp)J = pI = ApI and (3~ORp)J = dom(J) \pI = (-,p)I. This shows that J is a model of 
T2 with I c'" J. 
17Por an acyclic T-box without incomplete definition, a model is completely determined by its domain and 
the interpretation of the primitive concepts. (1) shows that J in fact is a model. 
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(2) Let J be a model of T2. We defme the interpretation I by dom(l) := dom(J); for all predicate 
symbols A not occurring negated in TI, AI := 'I'(A)I = AI; for all predicate symbols P occurring 
negated in Tb pI := { a; there exists b with (a,b) E RpI }. It is easy to see that I is a model of 
TI with Ie", J. 
Thus we have proven that ModLI(TI) ~ ModL2(T2). 
In the remainder of this section we shall consider the connection between expressive 
power of KR I-languages, as defmed above, and the complexity of the subsumption test for the 
languages.18 Let Ll and L2 be two KRI-languages such that Ll can be expressed by L2. That 
means that there exists a mapping X: LI ~ L2 with the property that any r E LI can be 
expressed by X(r) E L2. Subsumption in Ll can be reduced to subsumption in L2 as stated in 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 3.5. Let the element r of LI be expressed by X(r) W.T.t. '1': Pred(r) ~ 
Pred(X(r). Let A, B E Pred(r) be predicate symbols of the same arity. Then 
A 5;;r B iff 'I'(A) 5;;X(I) 'I'(B). 
Proof. Assu~e that AI $ BI for a model I E ModL/r), i.e., A $r B. There exists a model J 
E ModL2(X(r» such that I c'" J. Then 'I'(A)I = A $ BI = 'I'(B)I which shows 'I'(A) $X(r) 
'I'(B). The other direction can be shown in the same way. 
But the reduction function X need not be polynomial, i.e., the size of X(r) may be 
exponential- or even worse - in the size of r. The function X may even be non-computable. If 
we keep this in mind, it is not surprising that two KRI-languages may have the same expres-
sive power but different complexity - or even computability - behaviour with respect to sub-
sumption or other kinds of reasoning. We have already seen such an example. The languages 
!fLo and 'IL, as defined in Proposition 2.5, have the same expressive power since unfolding 
does not change the class of models. But the complexity of subsumption determination in !fLo 
is quadratic while it is co-NP-complete in 'IL 
It is not enough to consider complexity results for the languages. The compactness with 
which the language can express things is also very important. For example, it makes no sense 
to express number-restrictions such as 3~I()()()R by horribly large first-order formulas ( in this 
case with WOO variables) though the complexity of subsumption w.r.t. the size of the T-box 
containing the number-restrictions may be worse than w.r.t. the size of the set of first-order 
formulas. 
For some purposes a strengthened version of Definition 3.2 - which might require that 
the mapping X: LI ~ L2 is computable or that it is computable in polynomial time etc. - may be 
more appropriate; again a notion familiar from computability theory. 
18Subsumption for KRI-languages is defined in the obvious way. Let L be such a language and let r E L. 
For A, B E Pred(I) with the same arity we defme: A s;;r B iff AI ~ BI for all I E ModdI). 
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4. Alternative Definitions of Expressive Power 
In the fIrst part of this section we shall compare our defInition of expressive power with the 
notion "conservative extension of a fIrst-order theory", a concept frequently used in logic ( see 
e.g., Andrews (1986». In the second part we shall consider a special class ofKRI-languages 
where the sets of formulas are given by acyclic T -boxes. 
4.1. Conservative Extensions 
Let Ll be a KR1-language, let rl be an element of LI, and let P, Q be predicate symbols of 
arity n occurring in ri. We have defIned P ~rl Q iff pI ~ QI for all models I E ModL1(rI). 
Consider the formula S(P,Q) := 'v'XI'v'X2 . . . VXn ( P(X},X2, . . . ,Xn) ~ Q(XI,X2, . . . ,Xn) ). 
Obviously, pI ~ QI for all models I E ModL1 (rI) iff S(P,Q) is valid in all models I E 
ModL1(rI). 
Proposition 3.5 can now be reformulated as follows: Assume that rl is expressed by r2 
w.r.t. "', where r2 E L2 for a KR1-language L2. Let P, Q E Pred(rI) be predicate symbols of 
the same arity. Then S(P,Q) is valid in all models IE ModL1(rI) iff S(",(P),,,,(Q» is valid in 
all models J E Mod~(r2). 
One may now ask whether a similary property holds for arbitrary formulas, and not only 
for formulas of the form S(P,Q). This is related to the question whether r2 is a conservative 
extension of r 1. 
Let r be a set of fIrst-order formulas, and let A be a fIrst-order formula. The language 
L(r) of r is the set of all predicate, function, and constant symbols occurring in r. The formula 
A is a formula over .L(r) iff it only contains predicate, function, and constant symbols from 
L(I). We say that r ( semantically) implies A ( r FA) iff each model of r is a model of A. 
Definition 4.1. Let rI, r2 be sets of fIrst-order formulas such that .L(rI) ~ .L(r2). Then r2 
is a conservative extension of r 1 iff all formulas A over .L(r 1) satisfy r IF A iff r 2 F A. 
Let Ll and L2 be KR1-languages such that Ll can be expressed by L2, and let rl E Ll 
be expressed by r2 E L2 w.r.t. ",. Because of the translation function "', not even the 
precondition L(rI)!:: L(r2) in the defInition of conservative extension needs to be satisfIed. In 
order to cope with this problem we shall consider an obvious modification of DefInition 4.1. 
Definition 4.2. Let rI, r2 be sets of fIrst-order formulas, and let "': .L(rI) ~ .L(r2) be a 
mapping such that, for each n-ary predicate symbol P ( resp. n-ary function symbol f, constant 
symbol c ) in L(r 1), ",(P) ( resp. ",(f), ",(c) ) is an n-ary predicate symbol ( resp. n-ary 
function symbol, constant symbol ). For a formula A over L(rI), let ",(A) be the formula over 
L(r2) which is obtained from A by replacing the symbols of L(rI) by their ",-images. 
We say that r2 is a conservative extension of rl w.r.t. ljIiff all formulas A over .L(rl) satisfy 
riF A iff r2F ",(A). 
Because 'T F A" means that all models of r are models of A, we can only hope to get a 
connection between the notions 'TI E LI is expressed by r2 E L2 w.r.t. "," and 'T} is a 
conservative extension of r2 w.r.t. "," if we restrict our attention to KRI-languages without 
model restriction. A KR1-language L is a KRI-language without model restriction iff for all r 
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in L, ModdI1 is the class of all fIrst-order models ofr. But even in this case, the fact that rl 
E LI is expressed by r2 E L2 w.r.t. '" does not imply that r2 is a conservative extension of rl 
w.r.t. ",. 
Example 4.3. Let Ll and L2 be KR1-languages without model restriction such that rl := 
( 3x P(x) } E LI and r2 := ( 3x P(x), 3y -,P(y) } E L2. It is easy to see that rl is expressed 
by r2 w.r.t. '" = id. However, r2 is not a conservative extension of rl w.r.t. "'; for example, 
A = 3y ,P(y) is a formula over .L(rl) and r21= ",(A) = A, but the interpretation M which has 
dom(M) = pM = { a } is a model of r 1 which is not a model of A. 
The problem stems from the fact that, in the defInition of"MI is embedded in M2 by '1"', 
we did not require that dom(Md = dom(M2). In the case of KL-ONE-based KR-languages, 
this seems to be quite correct since we are only interested in the extensions of the concepts and 
roles defmed in our T-boxes; we are usually not interested in additional individuals which may, 
or may not be in the domain. 
Lemma 4.4. Let "': Pred(rl) ~ Pred(r2) be a mapping, let A be a formula over Pred(rl), 
and let M}, M2 ·be interpretations such that MI C'I'M2 and dom(Ml) = dom(M2). Then MI is a 
model of A iff M2 is a model of ",(A). 
, If MI C'I'M2 and dom(MI) = dom(M2), we say that MI is embedded in M2 by", with 
equality of domains. 
Proposition 4.5. Let Ll and L2 be KR1-languages without model restriction. Assume that 
rl E LI is expressed by r2 E L2 w.r.t. '" such that all embeddings of models are embeddings 
with equality of domains. Then r2 is a conservative extension ofrl w.r.t. ",. 
Proof. Let A be a formula over Pred(rl). We have to show that rll= A iff r21= ",(A). 
(1) Assume that r 1 1= A is not satisfIed, i.e., there exists a model M 1 of r 1 such that M 1 is not 
a model of A. The assumption of the proposition implies that there exists a model M2 of r2 
such that MI C'I'M2 and dom(MI) = dom(M2). By Lemma 4.4, M2 .is not a model of ",(A). 
(2) The other direction can be proved analogously. 
4.2. An Alternative Definition for a Special Case 
In Section 2 we have seen that acyclic T -boxes without incomplete defInitions and disjointness 
axioms can be unfolded. In this case we may restrict ourselves to unfolded T -boxes without 
changing the expressive power. The set of all admissible T-boxes is then completely determined 
by the set of all admissible concept and role terms. In addition, subsumption of concepts w.r.t. 
a terminology can be reduced to sUbsumption between concept terms. 19 This motivates the 
following defInition, which defInes expressive power only w.r.t. concept and role terms. 
Definition 4.6. Let Fl and F2 be two sets of concept and role terms.20 
(1) We say that A E Fl is equivalent to B E F2 ( A == B) iff { AI; where I is an interpre-
tation } = { BJ; where J is an interpretation }. 
19See Nebel (1989), Section 3.2.5. 
20we shall always assume that these sets of tenns contain all atomic concept and role tenns. The sets differ 
in the way more complex tenns can be buill 
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(2) FI can be expressed by F2 iff for all A E FI there exists BE F2 such that A == B. 
(3) FI and F2 have the same expressive power iff FI can be expressed by F2 and vice versa. 
The following is an example of two sets of concept terms which have the same expressive 
power, where expressive power is meant in the sense of Definition 4.6. 
Example 4.7. The set FI is defined as follows: a concept term is a finite conjunction of 
negated and unnegated concept names ( e.g., A n -,B n C is an admissible concept term). In 
F2 we only allow conjunction of unnegated concept names but we have an additional term 1., 
which has to be interpreted as the empty set. 
(1) F2 can be expressed by FI since the term 1. is equivalent to the term An-,A. 
(2) FI can be expressed by F2. This can be seen in the following way. Let the concept term D 
be an element of Fl. IfD contains A and -,A for some concept name A, then D is equivalent to 
the term 1.. Otherwise, each literal -,A may be replaced by a new concept name A'. This yields 
a concept term D' E F2 which is equivalent to the original term D. 
We shall now investigate the connection between this defmition of expressive power and 
the definition given in Section 3. 
Definition 4.8. Let F be a set of concept and role terms. 
The KR1-language L(F) is defined as follows: 
(1) L(F) contains all finite T-boxes of the form T = { ... , A = D, ... }, where A is a concept 
( role) name not occurring anywhere else in 1'21 and D E F is a concept ( role) term. 
(2) ModL(F)(T) is the class of all first-order models of T. 
If L(FI) can be expressed by L(F2) ( according to Definition 3.2 ) then FI can be 
expressed by F2 ( according to Definition 4.6 ),22 but not necessarily vice versa. 
Example 4.9. Let FI and F2 be as in Example 4.7. We have already seen that FI can be 
expressed by F2 ( according to Definition 4.6 ). We shall now show that L(FI) cannot be 
expressed by L(F2) ( according to Definition 3.2 ). 
Consider the T-box Tl := { A = P, B = -,P } E L(Ft}. Assume that T2 is a T-box of L(F2) 
such that ModL(Fl)(Tl) ~ ModL(F2)(T2) for some mapping '1'. 
For any model I of Tl we have AI n BI = 0. Hence any model J of T2 satifies 'I'(A)J n 'I'(B)J 
= 0. It is easy to see that this is only possible if either 'I'(A) = 1. or'l'(B) = 1. is an axiom in T2. 
But then the models I ofTI with AI * 0 * BI do not have corresponding models ofT2. This is 
a contradiction to ModL(Fl)(Tl) ='1' ModL(FV(T2). 
The problem with Definition 4.6 is that the connection is lost between the extensions of 
different terms with respect to the same interpretation. This shortcoming can be mended by 
considering n-tupels A = (A 1 , .. . ,An) E Fn of terms instead of single terms. 
Definition 4.10. Let FI and F2 be two sets of concept and role terms. 
(1) We say that A E FIn is equivalent to BE F2n (A == B) iff { (AII, ... ,AnI); where I is an 
interpretation} = { (B 1J, ... ,BnJ); where J is an interpretation }. 
21That means that D only contains primitive concepts and roles. i.e .• T is unfolded. 
22See Proposition 4.11. 
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(2) FI can be expressed by F2 iff for all n ~ 1 and all A E FIn there exists B. E F2n such that 
A==B. 
(3) FI and F2 have the same expressive power iff FI can be expressed by F2 and vice versa. 
Proposition 4.11. FI can be expressed by F2 according to Definition 4.10 if and only if 
L(FI) can be expressed by L(F2) according to Definition 3.2. 
Proof. (1) Assume that L(FI) can be expressed by L(F2) according to Definition 3.2. Let 
A = (AI, ... ,An) E FIn be an n-tuple of concept and role terms. We have to find an n-tuple BE 
F 2n such that A == B. 
Let CI, ... , Cn be concept or role names not occurring in A, where Ci is a concept name iff Ai 
is a concept term. The T-box T := { CI = AI, ... , Cn = An } is an element ofL(FI). Thus there 
exists aT-box T' of L(F2) and a mapping '!': Pred(T) ~ Pred(T') such that T is expressed by 
T' w.r.t. ,!,. 
For all i, 1 ~ i ~ n, the concept or role term Bi is defined as follows. If '!'(Ci) is a primitive 
concept or role in T', then Bi := '!'(Ci). If '!'(Ci) is a defined concept or role and '!'(Ci) = Di is 
its defming axiom in T', then Bi := Di. We have B. E F2n since the Bi are atomic terms or terms 
occurring as right hand side of an axiom in T'. It remains to be shown that A == B. 
(1.1) Let I be 'an interpretation. Since we are only interested in the extensions All, ... , AnI, 
and since the concept and role names C}, .. . , Cn do not occur in A, we may without loss of 
generality assume that CII = All, ... , CnI = AnI. That means that I is a model of T. Since T is 
e~pressed by T' w.r.t. '!', there exists a model J of T' such that RI = ,!,(R)J for all R E Pred(T). 
We have Ail = Cil = '!'(Ci)J = Bl In fact, if '!'(Ci) is a primitive concept or role in T', then 
'!'(CiY = BiJ since Bi = '!'(Ci). If ,!,(CD is a defined concept or role, then ,!,(CDJ = Bl since J is 
a model of T' and '!'(Ci) = Bi is an axiom of T' . 
Thus we have shown that { (AII, ... ,Anl); where I is an interpretation} !:: { (BIJ, ... ,BnJ); 
where J is an interpretation }. 
(1.2) Let J be an interpretation. The definition of the languages L(F) implies that the terms 
B I, . . . , Bn do not contain any defined concepts or roles of T'. Thus, if we are only interested 
in (BIJ, ... ,BnJ), we may without loss of generality assume that J is a model ofT'. We can now 
proceed as in (1.1). 
(2) Assume that FI can be expressed by F2 according to Definition 4.10. Let T = { Cl = Dl, 
.. . , Cn = Dn } be a T-box of L(FI) containing the defined concepts and roles Cl, . .. , Cn, and 
the primitive concepts and roles PI. . . . , Pm. Please note that, by the definition of L(FI), the 
terms DI, ... , Dn may only contain primitive concepts and roles. We consider the tuple 
(D}, ... ,Dn,PI, ... ,Pm), which is an element of Fln+m. By the assumption, there exists a tuple 
(EI. ... ,En,Q}, ... ,Qm) in F1n+m such that (D}' ... ,Dn,PI. ... ,Pm) == (EI. ... ,En,QI. ... ,Qm). 
Let A}, ... , An, Bl, ... , Bm be concept and role names not occurring in (EI, ... ,En,QI, ... ,Qrn), 
where Ai ( Bi ) is a concept name iff Ei ( Q ) is a concept term. The T -box T' is defmed as { A I 
= E}, ... , Bm = Qrn }. We defme the mapping '!': Pred(T) ~ Pred(T') by'!'(Ci) := Ai and '!'(Pj) 
:= Bj- It remains to be shown that T is expressed by T' w.r.t. '!'. ' -: 
(2.1) Assume that I is a model of T. Since FI can be expressed by F2, there exists an 
interpretation J such that (*) (DII, ... ,DnI,PII, ... ,PmI) = (E1J, ... ,EnJ,QIJ, ... ,QmJ). Since A}, 
... , An, Bl, ... , Bm do not occur in (EI, ... ,En,QI, ... ,Qm), we may - without losing property 
(*) - assume that J is a model of T'. We have qI = DiI since I is a model of T, DiI = EiJ 
because of property (*), and El = AiJ since J is a model of T'. This yields ql = '!'(Ci)J; and 
PiI = '!'(Pi)J can be shown similarly. 
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(2.2) Assume that J is a model of T'. Since Fl can be expressed by F2, there exists an 
interpretation I such that (*) (OII, ... ,DnI,PII, ... ,PmI) = (EIJ, ... ,EnJ,QIJ, ... ,QmJ). Since CI, 
. .. , Cn do not occurr in (01, ... ,Dn,PI,. " ,Pm), we may - without losing property (*) - assume 
that I is a model ofT. We can now proceed as in (2.1). 
5. Examples 
This section contains some more examples to demonstrate how Definition 3.2 can be used to 
prove that one KRI-languages is more expressive than another. In the first example, we shall 
see how Schild's argument in favour of the expressive power of V. fits into the framework of 
Defmition 3.2. The second example shows that the exists-restrictions in 1"£- are responsible for 
an increase of expressive power when we go from 1" LQ to 1"£-. We have already seen in 
Lemma 2.6, that these additional exists-restrictions do not increase the complexity of 
subsumption determination. In the third example, we shall see that augmenting 1"£- by exists-in 
restrictions increases the expressive power. This yields a formal proof for the fact that 1"£ is 
more expressive than 1"£-.23 The forth example is concerned with cyclic terminologies. 
Example 5.1. In Schild (1988) there is an example of aT-box TI of the language V. which 
contains a concept A ( Schild calls it "mankind without rebirth" ) such that AI is infmite for all 
models I of TI. The T-box TI is consistent, i.e., it has at least one model. Let L be a KRl-
language such that, for all [' E L, the class ModL(f') of admissible models of [' is either empty 
or contains at least one model with fmite domain.24 Then V. cannot be expressed by L. 
Assume that [' E L expresses TI w.r.t. '1': Pred(TI) ~ Pred(f'). Moddf') cannot be empty 
since Tl is consistent. Hence there is J E Moddr) with finite domain dom(J). Let I be the 
corresponding model of TI with I c'I' J. But 'I'(AY C dom(J) is finite and AI is infmite, which 
is a contradiction since I c'I' J implies AI = 'I'(AY. 
Example 5.2. In Lemma 2.6 we have seen that subsumption determination in 1"£- can be re-
duced to sUbsumption determination in 1".£.0: for any T-box T in 1"£- one can construct aT-box 
TO in 1"£0 such that TO and T have the same size and for all concept names A, B in T, A !iT B 
iff A !iTo B. 
Nevertheless, T is not expressed by TO in the sense of Definition 3.2. We shall now show that 
1"£- cannot be expressed by 1"£0. This means that the additional exists-restrictions in 1"£- in-
crease the expressive power of the language. In the proof we shall need the following lemma. 
Lemma 5.2.1. Let T be a T-box of 1"LQ and let A be a concept name occurring in T. Let I 
and J be models of T with the same domain, such that I and J coincide on all primitive concepts 
and for all roles25 S, SJ !;; SI. Then AI C AJ. 
Proof. If A is primitive then AI = AJ. Otherwise, T contains ( w.l.o.g. ) a terminological 
axiom of the form A = V'S llV'S 12 .. . V'S InI:PI n ... n V'SkIV'Sk2 ... V'Sknk:Pk, where the Pj 
23The :F.l.rterm (SOME (RESTRICT R C» has the same semantics as our exists-in construct 3R:C. 
24Many languages satisfy this property, e.g., :FL and :FL- of Levesque-Brachman (1987), or 4J?F and '1-£4J?F 
of Nebel (1989). 
25In :FLo all roles are primitive. 
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are primitive concepts.26 Assume that an element bo of dom(J) is not in AI. Then there exists j, 
1 ~ j ~ k, and b}, ... , bnj E dom(J) such that (bo,bl) E SjlI, ... , (bnrl,bnj) E Sjn/ and bnj e 
Pi- But then (bo,bl) E Sjll, ... , (bnj_I.bnj) E Sjn/ and bnj e Pl This shows bo e AI. 
Consider the T-box Tl = { A = 3R }, which is an admissible T-box of :FL-. Assume that Tl is 
expressed by T2 E :FLo w.r.t. '1'. Let I be the model of Tl defined by dom(I) := { a, b } and 
RI:= { (a,b) }. Then AI = { a }. Since I is a model ofTl there exists a modelJ ofT2 with I c'I' 
J. Let J' be the model of T2 which coincides with J on all primitive concepts and on all roles 
except ",(R), and which interprets ",(R) as the empty set 
Lemma 5.2.1 implies that 'I'(A)1 ~ 'I'(A)J'. Because Tl is expressed by T2 w.r.t. '1', there exists 
a model I' of Tl such that I' c'l' J'. But RI' = ",(Ri' = 0 and a E ",(Ai <;; ",(AY' = AI' = (3R)1' 
is a contradiction. This shows that the T-box Tl of 1'£- cannot be expressed by any T-box of 
:FLo· 
Example 5.3. We shall now show that the T-box Tl := { A = 3R: 3S: P }, which uses 
exists-in-restrictions, cannot be expressed by a T-box of 1'£-. Before we can stait with the 
proof, we need. a lemma, which is similar to Lemma 5.2.1 above. 
Lemma 5.3.1. Let T be a T-box of :FL- and let A be a concept name occurring in T. Let I 
and J be models of T with the same domain, such that I and J coincide on all primitive 
concepts. Assume that for all roles S and all a E dom(I), SI ~ SI and { b; (a,b) E SI } :F- 0 
implies { b; (a,b) E SI } :F- 0. Then AI ~ AI. 
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 5.2.1. 
Assume that Tl is expressed by T2 E 1'L- w.r.t. '1'. Let I be the model of Tl defined by dom(I) 
:= { a, b, c, d } := pI, SI:= { (b,c) } and RI := { (a,b), (a,d) }. Then AI = { a }. 
Let J be a model of T2 with I c'I' J. Let J' be the model of T2 which coincides with J on all 
primitive concepts and roles with the exception of'l'(R). The extension of'l'(R) w.r.t. J' is 
defined as 'I'(R)J' := 'I'(R)1 \ { (a,b) }. By Lemma 5.3.1, a E 'I'(A)1 ~ ",(A)J'. 
Let I' be a model ofTl with I' c'I'J'. Then SI' = { (b,c) } and RI' = { (a,d) }. But we have 
also a E 'I'(A)J'= AI' = (3R: 3S: P)I'. This is a contradiction, since the element "d" - which is 
the only RI' -successor of the element "a" - does not have an SI' -successor. 
Example 5.4. Nebel's normal-form language 9{'I:F ( see Nebel (1989), p. 59 ff. ) is defined 
as follows: it allows concept and role conjunctions, all-in-restrictions, number-restrictions and 
negation of undefmed concepts. The T-boxes contain only complete definitions. 
Let Ll be the language which contains only the acyclic T-boxes of 9{iJ':F and takes all first-
order models as admissible models. On the other hand, let L2 be the language, which contains 
all T-boxes of 9{Pf and allows only the greatest fixed-point models ( gfp-models ) as admis-
sible models of cyclic T-boxes.27 Then Ll is a sublanguage of L2. 
(1) The T-box T := { A = ('v'R:A) n (3~lS) } is an element of L2. Considered with gfp-
semantics, this T-box says something about the reflexive, transitive closure of R: if R* denotes 
26See Proposition 3 in Nebel (1989a). 
27See Nebel (1989), Chapter 5, and Baader(199Oa.b) for the definition and for properties of gfp-models. 
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the reflexive, transitive closure of R28, then T means the same as { A = V'R*: 3~IS }. This is 
an immediate consequence of Proposition 7.1 in Baader (1990a). A gfp-model of T is uniquely 
determined by the extensions of R, S. On the other hand, any partial interpretation - which 
consists of a domain and extensions for R and S - can be extended to a gfp-model of T. 
We shall now prove that the T-box T cannot be expressed by a T-box of Lt. This shows that 
cycles really add something to the expressive power. 
(2) Assume that T' is a T-box of Lt such that T is expressed by T' w.r.t. '1': Pred(T) ~ 
Pred(T'). Since T' is acyclic, we may without loss of generality assume that it is unfolded. That 
means that the role temis occurring on the right hand sides of axioms of T' are of the form Ql n 
. .. n Qn, where the Q are primitive roles. The concept terms on the right hand sides of axioms 
of T' contain only primitive concepts and roles. It is easy to see that the concept terms V'R:(B n 
C) and (V'R:B) n (V'R:C) are equivalent. Hence any concept term can be transformed into a 
finite conjunction of tenns of the fonn V'Rl:V'R2: ... V'Rn:C, where the Ri are role tenns of T', 
and C has one of the following fonns: 
(2.1) C = P for a primitive concept P, or 
(2.2) C = -oP for a primitive concept P, or 
(2.3) C = 3~nQ for a role tenn Q, or 
(2.4) C = 3~nQ for a role tenn Q. 
We shall abbreviate the prefix "V'Rl:V'R2: ... V'Rn" by "V'W" where W = RIR2 ... Rn is a word 
over the set of role tenns occurring in T'. In the case n = 0 we also write "V'£:C"29 instead of 
simply "C". For an interpretation J and a word W = RIR2 ... Rn, WI denotes the composition 
RIIoR2Io ... oRnI of the binary relations R1I, R2I, ... , RnI. The tenn £1 denotes the identity 
relation, i.e., £J = ( (d,d); d E dom(J) }. 
(3) Let I be the gfp-model of T defined by dom(I) := { bi; i ~ 0 } U { Ci; i ~ 0 }, RI := 
{ (bi,bi+l); i ~ 0 }, and SI := { (bi,Cj); i ~ 0 }. Using Proposition 7.1 of Baader (1990a), it is 
easy to see that AI = { bi; i ~ 0 }. 
(4) Let J be a model of T' such that I c'" J. Without loss of generality we may assume that 
'I'(R) and 'I'(S) are defmed roles in T '. The defming axioms for'l'(R) and'l'(S) are of the fonn 
'I'(R) = Rl n ... n Rk n Ql n . .. n Qs, 
'I'(S) = SI n ... n Sr n Ql n . .. n Qs, 
where Rl, ... , Rk ( SI, ... , Sr ) are primitive roles not occurring in the definition of S (R), and 
Q}. . . . , Qt are the primitive roles occurring in both defmitions. 
Since RI = 'I'(R)I, SI = 'I'(S )I, and RI and SI are nonempty and disjoint, we know that k ~ 1 
and r ~ 1. 
(5) The model J' of T' is defined as follows: dom(1') := dom(J); pI' := pI for all primitive 
concepts P; R II':= ... := RkI' := 'I'(R)I, SII':= ... := SkI' := 'I'(S)I, QII ':= ... := QtI' := 
'I'(R)1 U 'I'(s)1; and QI' := 0 for all the other primitive roles. 
Let I' be a model of T such that I' c~ 1'. We have RI' = 'I'(R)1' = 'I'(R)I = RI, and SI' = 'I'(S)I' 
= 'I'(sy = SI. Thus 'I'(A)1' = AI' = AI = { bi; i ~ 0 }. 
28That means that for all interpretations I. the extension of R* w.r.t. I is defined as the reflexive. transitive 
closure of RI. 
29"E" denotes the empty word 
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(6) Let t be a nonnegative integer, and let J" be the model of T' which coincides with J' on the 
extensions of all primitive concepts and roles with the exception of SI: SIJ" := SIJ' \ { (btocV }. 
Let I" be a model of T such that I" c'" J". We have RI" = ",(R)]" = ",(R)J' = RI, and SI" = 
",(s)1" = ",(S)J' \ { (btocV } = SI \ { (btocV }. Thus ",(AY" = AI" = { bi; i > t }. 
In particular, we have bo e: ",(A)1". We have seen in (2) that the defining axiom for ",(A) is of 
the form'll(A) = D where D is a conjunction of terms VW:C as described in (2). Assume that 
the term VW:C is responsible for bo e: 'II(A)]". That means that there exists an individual e E 
dom(J") such that boWJ"e and e e: CJ". Obviously, we also have boWJ'e; and since bo E 
",(AY" this yields e E CJ'. 
The fact that e e: cJ" and e E cJ' implies that C is of the form 3~Q for a role term Q. In fact, C 
cannot be of the form (2.1) or (2.2) since the J"-extensions of all primitive concepts are the 
same as their l' -extensions. The term C cannot be of the form (2.4) since the J"-extensions of 
all role terms are contained in their l' -extensions. 
(7) The only individual having less role successors in J" than in l' is the individual bt . Thus e 
e: (3~nQY" and e E (3~nQ)J' implies that e = bt. The definition of the role extensions in l' and 
J" implies that the J"-extension of any role term in T' is contained in the relation RI U SI. Thus 
bo WJ"bt yieldslWI = t. This is a contradiction if we choose t big enough. 
In Baader (1990a), I have also considered cyclic terminologies for a small language ( only 
concept conjunction and all-in-restrictions are allowed) w.r.t. three different kinds of 
semantics: greatest fixed-point semantics, least fixed-point semantics, and what Nebel (1989) 
calls descriptive semantics. It turns out that these three kinds of semantics are incomparable 
w.r.t. expressive power, i.e., it is not the case that one of them can be expressed by another 
one. All three are more expressive than the corresponding language which allows only acyclic 
T-boxes ( that is the language rJL, which was defined in Proposition 2.5 ). 
6. Conclusion 
This paper provides a definition of expressive power ofKR-languages that depends only on the 
model-theoretic semantics for the languages. The definition enables us to compare different 
KR-languages without any reference to purely intuitive arguments. This does not mean that the 
results which can be obtained by using this defmition are counterintuitive. On the contrary, .the 
examples show that they coincide with what has informally been claimed. But now intuition can 
be backed up by formal proofs. We have concentrated more on negative proofs - which 
demonstrate that a given language cannot be expressed by another language - because for those 
a formal definition of expressive power is indispensable. It turned out that finding negative 
proofs is rather hard, even for examples where a difference in expressive power seems to be 
intuitively clear. This indicates that comparison of expressive power is a complex problem 
where one should not solely rely on intuition. 
Though we have only considered KL-ONE-based KR-Ianguage, our notion of expressive 
power can be used for all KR-languages with model-theoretic semantics. It provides an 
important tool for the investigation of differences and similarities between various KR-
languages. In the design of KR-systems it can be used to avoid redundant constructs and to 
decide what kind of constructs should be included. 
The definition of expressiveness also sheds a new light on the tradeoff between expres-
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sive power and tractability ofreasoning. We have seen that there are KR-Ianguages which have 
the same expressive power but different complexity for subsumption determination. This 
shows that it is not enough to consider complexity results for the languages. The compactness 
with which the language can express things is also very important. A KR-Ianguage may be able 
to express things in a very compact form - which is convenient for the user - but may have, 
just for that reason, a bad complexity behaviour for the reasoning component. Nevertheless, 
this language should be preferred to an equivalent language which needs a large set of formulas 
to describe the same thing, and has - with respect to this already very large input - a better 
complexity behaviour. Sometimes, the tradeoff lies between convenience and computational 
tractabili ty. 
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